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General Maritime Law and the Wrongful Death
Dilemma
"No area of federal law is judge-made at its source to such an
extent as is the law of admiralty."
Felix Frankfurter
from Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 362
U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 1970, the Supreme Court decided Moragne v. States
Marine Lines,' which has been referred to as "probably the most im-
portant wrongful death case holding in the entire history of American
jurisprudence-perhaps, in all Anglo-American jurisprudence. ' 2 This
comment will briefly explore the decision itself. More importantly, it
will explore subsequent development of the law through the numerous
decisions of the lower courts, to whom the Supreme Court entrusted a
I. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
2. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 6 (Supp. 1972). As used in this com-
ment, a wrongful death action refers to a cause of action which arises in favor of a
person for the damages he suffers due to the death of another. A survival action is an
action brought by a third person for those damages the decedent suffered prior to his
death and for which the decedent would have been able to have sued had he survived.
See S. SPEISER, RECOvERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §§ 1.1, 14.1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
SPEIR].
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major role in the formulation of the elements comprising a new right
of action for wrongful death under the general maritime law.
A full understanding of the events since the decision in Moragne is
facilitated by occasional reference to historical precedent. The histori-
cal perspective has been narrowed as much as possible, however, allow-
ing more detailed treatment of the decisions since Moragne.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Wrongful Death Actions
Traditionally, the common law did not recognize an action for
wrongful death and, as a result such action was not recognized in
courts of the United States in the absence of a statutorily created cause
of action.8 Under the common law rules the defendant was financially
better off killing a person rather than injuring him.4
The first statutorily created cause of action came with the passage in
England of the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846. 5 The result has been the
passage of a statutory remedy for wrongful death in every American
state.8
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in The Harrisburg7 in 1886,
American courts were split on whether a cause of action for wrongful
death existed under the general maritime law.
The Harrisburg, however, settled the controversy wherein the Court
held that no right of action existed in the general maritime law. The
Harrisburg involved a death which occurred within state territorial
waters and not on the high seas. The Court quickly augmented this
decision with The Alaska,8 a decision handed down three years later
which applied The Harrisburg rule to deaths occurring on the high
seas.
In response to the effect of these holdings, Congress eventually en-
acted two statutes in 1920 which established a statutory right of recov-
ery for wrongful death. The first of the two was the Death on the High
3. See Cutting v. Seabury, 6 F. Cas. 1083 (No. 3521) (D.C.D. Mass. 1860), for historical
background.
4. See the discussion of survival actions in this comment.
5. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, §§ 1-6 (1846) (commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act).
6. See Smith, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. Rev. 437 (1966)
(Appendix A). See generally Spisza, supra note 2.
7. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
8. 130 U.S. 201 (1889).
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Seas Act9 (DOHSA) which provided a remedy for death resulting from
a wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring "beyond a marine
league." 10 The second was the Jones Act1' which was available only to
seamen in an action against their employers.
DOHSA specifically provided that it would not preclude the applica-
tion of state statutes to deaths occurring within state territorial waters.12
This provision merely continued a policy which had been recognized
even prior to the decision in The Harrisburg. However, it was not until
the Supreme Court's decision in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, that the
Court conclusively established the right to bring an in personam action
in admiralty for wrongful death within the territorial waters of a state
based on that state's wrongful death statute.'4 In addition, the Court
held that in bringing a suit based on a state statute the admiralty doc-
trine of laches would not apply to determine the timeliness of the suit,
preferring instead to apply the applicable state statute of limitations.15
The Court reasoned that "[t]he liability and the remedy are created by
the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are, therefore, to
be treated as limitations of the right."'16
A number of cases which followed Garcia only served to further con-
fuse the issue as to what extent state law would be applicable to creat-
ing the liability and limiting the remedy for wrongful death actions.17
One example is the decision in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.'8
The plaintiff, as administratrix of her son's estate, brought an action
under the Jones Act for his wrongful death. In addition to alleging
negligence under the Jones Act, the plaintiff also alleged unseaworthi-
ness under the general maritime law together with ihe Ohio wrongful
death statute.19 The Court, relying on the 1930 decision in Lindgren v.
9. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970). The high seas are generally considered to be the waters
outside the three mile limit.
10. Id. § 761.
11. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
12. Id. § 767.
13. 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
14. Id. at 242.
15. Id. at 243.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); Hess v. United
States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960) (allowing court to impose a higher standard of conduct than
that imposed by the admiralty in accordance with state law); The Tungus v. Skovaard, 358
U.S. 588 (1959) (The state's laws would be determinative as to the kind of conduct which
would give rise to an action for wrongful death); Leverson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953)
(although bound to apply state law as found, federal coufis are not bound by state
procedural law which was not an "integral part" of the state created right).
18. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
19. Id. at 150. The Court cited OHIo RLv. CoDE ANN. § 2125.01 (Anderson 1967).
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United States,20 held that the Jones Act provided an exclusive right of
action for the death of seamen killed in the course of their employ-
ment, superseding the state wrongful death statute. which might other-
wise apply to a maritime death.21 Recovery for unseaworthiness was
precluded because the Jones Act only applies to an action based on
negligence.22
B. Survival Actions
The Jones Act represented the first federal statute which provided
for a survival action.23 The Death on the High Seas Act 24 has generally
been construed as not providing for the recovery of the decedent's pain
and suffering prior to death;25 allowing recovery for pecuniary loss
only.26 While preempting the wrongful death field, DOHSA has not
precluded courts from applying state survival statutes to deaths occur-
ring beyond a marine league.2 7
III. Moragne v. States Marine Lines
A. Facts
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines,28 the Supreme Court unani-
mously overruled The Harrisburg and held that an action for wrongful
death does exist under general maritime law.29 Moragne involved a
longshoreman who was killed while working aboard defendant's vessel
within the territorial waters of Florida. The decedent's widow sued un-
der Florida's wrongful death statute3° in a state court alleging negli-
gence and unseaworthiness. After the action was removed to federal
court by defendant,31 the count based on unseaworthiness was dismissed
on the grounds that the applicable Florida wrongful death act did not
encompass any liability based on unseaworthiness. In an unusual inter-
20. 281 US. 38 (1930).
21. 379 U.S. at 154-55.
22. Id. at 154.
23. Petition of United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970).
24. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970).
25. Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386, 1388 (3d Cir. 1971).
26. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1970).
27. Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386, 1389 (3d Cir. 1971).
28. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
29. Id. at 409.
30. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1971).
31. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (1970) (removal).
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locutory appeals 2-- based in part on a procedure permitted under Flor-
ida law which allowed the Fifth Circuit to refer the question to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court for a decision on the Florida statute's coverage 88-
the court of appeals affirmed84 the district court's conclusion based on
the Florida Supreme Court's answer to the question certified8 5 Before
ruling on dismissal, the court heard appellant's argument that recovery
under the warranty of seaworthiness could be allowed under the gen-
eral maritime law, the rule of The Tungus v. Skovgaard8" notwith-
standing. The court of appeals found this argument to be unpersua-
sive.87 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 8  and invited the United
States to participate as amicus curiae 9 "to reconsider the important
question of remedies under federal maritime law for tortious deaths on
state territorial waters. ' 40 Taking advantage of the opportunity to par-
ticipate as amicus curiae the United States, in their oral argument,
pointed out three anomalies41 which would have been perpetuated had
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
33. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1971).
34. 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
35. 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
36. 358 U.S. 588 (1959). The Court held, with four members dissenting, that state
wrongful death statutes cannot be supplemented by admiralty principles but must be im-
plemented as interpreted by state courts as an integrated whole with whatever conditions
and limitations the creating state has attached. Id. at 592.
37. 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
38. 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
39. Id. at 952.
40. 398 U.S. 375, 377 (1970).
41. Id. at 395.
The first of these is simply the discrepancy produced whenever the rule of The
Harrisburg holds sway: within territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal
law (here the furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) produces liability if the victim is
merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed.
The second incongruity is that identical breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy
ship, resulting in death, produce liability outside the three-mile limit--since a claim
under the Death on the High Seas Act may be founded on unseaworthiness .. .
-but not within the territorial waters of a state whose local statute excludes un-
seaworthiness claims. The United States argues that since the substantive duty is fed-
eral, and federal maritime jurisdiction covers navigable waters within and without the
three-mile limit, no national policy supports this distinction in the availability of a
remedy.
The third ...anomaly is that a true seaman . . . -- covered by the Jones Act-is
provided no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters,
while a longshoreman, to whom the duty of seaworthiness was extended only because
he performs work traditionally done by seaman, does have such a remedy when al-
lowed by a state statute.
id. (citations omitted).
The Court cited Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964), as a joint
contributor to the third anomaly in conjunction with the rule of The Harrisburg. In
Gillespie, the Court held that the Jones Act, by providing a claim for wrongful death
based on negligence, precluded any state remedy for wrongful death of a seaman in terri-
torial waters-whether based on negligence or unseaworthiness. The Court stated that the
Jones Act necessarily superseded the application of the death statutes of the several states.
Id. at 155.
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the Court not recognized a general maritime remedy for wrongful
death.42
B. Decision
In the opinion, by Justice Harlan, the Court concluded that The
Harrisburg was itself an "unjustifiable anomaly" in the present mari-
time law and overruled it.4 3 In addition, the Court indicated that The
Harrisburg was probably incorrect when decided; the rule denying the
remedy having been based on early English principles which never
were adopted by American courts and long since discarded by Great
Britain.44 The Court, however, found no necessity for overruling The
Harrisburg on this basis. Instead, they reasoned that "the rule against
recovery for wrongful death was sharply out of keeping with the
policies of modem American maritime law" as evidenced by a "whole-
sale abandonment" of the common law rule by state45 and federal4"
statutes.47 From a review of these statutes the Court concluded that
"there is no present public policy against allowing recovery for wrong-
ful death.148
C. Left Unresolved
Equally important to a consideration of what Moragne held is a dis-
cussion of what the decision specifically did not decide. The Court de-
liberately chose not to delimit the precise scope of the newly created
cause of action for wrongful death. Specifically, the Moragne decision
reserved judgment on the questions of who would qualify as a potential
beneficiary, 4 what time limitations would be imposed on the right to
42. It must be noted here that the third anomaly, as it refers to longshoremen, has
been drastically altered by recent amendments to the Longshoreman's and Harbor Work-
er's Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1970).
43. 398 U.S. at 409.
44. Id. at 381.
45. See text corresponding to note 6 supra.
46. Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1970) (pertaining to railroad
employees); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) (merchant seamen); Death on the High
Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-62 (1970) (any person on the high seas). Cf. National Parks
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1970); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43
(1970) (making state wrongful death statutes applicable to particular areas within federal
jurisdiction).
47. 398 U.S. at 388.
48. Id. at 390.
49. "We do not determine this issue now, for we think its final resolution should await
further sifting through the lower courts in future litigation." Id. at 408.
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bring suit,50 and what constitutes the proper measure of damage in a
federal maritime action for wrongful death.51 The Court declined to
restrict the elements of the cause of action to the provisions of the
Jones Act, DOHSA, or any other wrongful death statute, instead direct-
ing the lower courts to consider both federal and state acts for guidance
in fashioning the particulars of the new remedy.52 The remainder of
this comment will be devoted to a consideration of events which have
further developed the general maritime remedy for wrongful death first
established in Moragne.
IV. POsT-Moragne DEVELOPMENT
A. Defenses-generally
Prior to Moragne, when a death occurred within the territorial
waters of a state-so that the state right of action for wrongful death
might be applicable in admiralty-any defenses which were available
under the state statute were equally available in the admiralty.53
Among these defenses was included the appropriate state limitations
period.5 4
Moragne has altered this situation to the extent that the Court cre-
ated a right of action not dependent upon adjacent state law. There-
fore, only those defenses available in admiralty may now be properly
asserted.5 5 Where, for example, contributory negligence might have
been a valid defense under state law prior to Moragne, the traditional
admiralty comparative negligence doctrine would now be applicable.58
50. "We need not decide this question now, because the present case was brought
within a few months of the accident and no question of timeliness has been raised." Id.
at 406.
51. "If still other subsidiary issues should require resolution, such as particular ques-
tions of the measure of damages, the courts will not be without persuasive analogy for
guidance. Both the Death on the High Seas Act and the numerous state wrongful-death
acts have been implemented with success for decades." Id. at 408.
52. Id. at 405-08.
53. Goett v. Union Carbide Co., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314
(1960); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
54. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Emerson v. Holloway Concrete
Prods. Co., 282 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1960).
55. Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970).
56. Simpson v. Knutsen, 444 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1971); Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431
F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970); Green v. Ross, 338 F. Supp. 365 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
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B. Laches
Although the Supreme Court avoided a decision on the applicable
limitations period for a Moragne-type action, 57 the opinion did com-
ment favorably on the argument advanced by the United States.58 It
was argued that since the Court was only removing a barrier to general
maritime actions for fatal injuries, there seemed to be no reason why
the admiralty doctrine of laches should not apply.59 By applying this
doctrine, consideration could be given to the two year statute of limita-
tions in DOHSA.60 Such consideration is consistent with the past prac-
tices of federal courts to look for analogy to appropriate state or for-
eign statutes of limitations absent a provision in federal law.6' Blind
acceptance, however, of a two year statute of limitations in all situations
is not the best possible resolution of this issue. The Second Circuit, for
example, in Fitzgerald v. A.L. Burbank & Co.,6 2 has interpreted
Moragne to indicate that the two year limitation period of DOHSA
would be applicable, by analogy, even though the general maritime
claim was joined with a Jones Act cause of action, which generally
allows a plaintiff three years in which to bring an action.63 The result
reached by the Second Circuit was exactly opposite the decision
reached by the district court of Maryland in Thomas v. C.J. Langen-
felder & Son, Inc." The Maryland court refused to adopt the two year
limitation of DOHSA for an action based on unseaworthiness which
had been joined with a Jones Act claim, applying instead the three
year limitation period of the Jones Act.65 The court relied on Mc-
Allister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.66 In McAllister, the Supreme Court
held67 that when a Jones Act claim is joined with an action based on un-
seaworthiness the court is precluded from applying a shorter period of
limitation than was allowable by Congress.68 McAllister was distin-
57. See quote at note 50 supra.
58. 398 U.S. at 406.
59. Id.
60. 46 U.S.C. § 763 (1970).
61. Kenny v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1965); Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293
F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).
62. 451 F.2d 670, 683 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Raskin v. P.D. Marchissini, Inc., 437 F.2d
563, 566 (2d Cir. 1971); McGlenon v. Boeing Co., 437 F.2d 433, 435 (9th Cir. 1971).
63. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The Jones Act incorporates by reference the provisions of
the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970).
64. 324 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1971).
65. Id. at 327.
66. 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
67. Id. at 224.
68. Id.
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guished by the Second Circuit in Fitzgerald" on the ground that as the
decision was rendered prior to Moragne, it merely held that "a state
court could not use its own statute of limitations on an unseaworthiness
claim to force a plaintiff to bring his action before the three years al-
lowed by Congress for a Jones Act complaint."70 The court in Fitz-
gerald reasoned that since they were applying by analogy a limitation
period based on a federal statute, rather than a state statute, no rele-
vance attached to the traditional argument that Congress would be
ousted from its "paramount position in the admiralty field." 71 At pres-
ent, the courts which have considered the issue of the timeliness of suit
are far from reaching the uniformity required of the admiralty.72
C. Beneficiaries
As with the statute of limitations issue, the Court in Moragne spe-
cifically reserved judgment on the question of who the appropriate
beneficiaries are under a general maritime cause of action for wrongful
death,73 but the Court did note the argument advanced by the United
States as amicus curiae stating that the Court should look for guidance
to those wrongful death acts passed by Congress.7 4 Before the decision
69. 451 F.2d at 683 n.12.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. , Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 US. 375 (1970). The Court stated federal ad-
miralty law should be "a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the
whole country." Id. at 402. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 654, 661 (1875). Compare,
e.g., the decision in Thomas v. C.J. Langenfelder, 324 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1971) with
Epling v. M.T. Epling Co., 435 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1970) (petitioner not allowed to amend
his complaint subsequent to Moragne decision so as to include a Moragne-type allegation);
Mascuilli v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (remanded for reconsideration
of damages in light of Moragne decision after seven previous adjudications first com-
mencing in 1959). See also United States Steel v. Lamp, 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970); In re
Cambria S.S. Co., 353 F. Supp. 691, 692 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
73. See text corresponding to note 49 supra.
74. 398 U.S. at 406-07. Specific reference was actually made to the Longshoreman's and
Harbor-Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1970); the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1970) (incorporating provisions of the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970)); and the Death on the
High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-62 (1970). Of these statutes, it was argued by the United
States that DOHSA should be applied as it dealt exclusively with actions for wrongful
death for breaches of a maritime duty. In contrast, the Jones Act was only applicable to a
specific class of actions, i.e., a seaman against his employer, and based on a standard of
negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Longshoreman's and Harbor-
Workers' Compensation Act was seen to rest on principles of recovery foreign to the gen-
eral maritime law. The United States argued, therefore, that the borrowing of the scheduleof beneficiaries from DOHSA could "not only effectuate the expressed congressional prefer-
ences in this area, but will also promote uniformity by ensuring that the beneficiaries willbe the same for identical torts, rather than varying with the employment status of the dece-
dent. There is no occasion . . . to borrow from the law of the relevant coastal State since
the underlying duties to be effectuated are entirely federal and Congress has expressed its
preference of beneficiaries for violation of maritime law." 398 U.S. at 406-08.
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in The Harrisburg, some courts had allowed a recovery for wrongful
death under general maritime law. It was frequently concluded that
there existed a "natural right" to bring suit.75 In The Manhasset, for
example, the court rejected as "unknown to the maritime law," the
right of an administrator to bring suit in admiralty for wrongful
death.70 What the court did decide, however, was that a father or
mother had a "natural right" to bring suit, in their own name and for
their own benefit, for damages arising out of the death of a son. Addi-
tionally, a wife could recover for her husband's death; minor children
for their father's death.77 In effect, the right of action attached to only
a limited number of persons. Neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA
picked up this "natural right" concept, preferring instead that an ac-
tion for wrongful death be brought by the personal representative of
the deceased for the benefit of named beneficiaries in the respective
statutes. Under the Jones Act, the classes of beneficiaries are mutually
exclusive so that if one class of beneficiaries is in existence it will
receive the benefits to the exclusion of all other classes of beneficiaries
in existence. In addition, the priority of taking is listed.78 The provi-
sions of DOHSA are far less restrictive than the Jones Act, providing
that an action can be brought "for the exclusive benefit of the de-
cedent's wife, husband, parent, child or dependent relative . . ." re-
gardless of whether or not one of the other named beneficiaries has
asserted a right to damages.7 9
Only a few cases since Moragne have faced the issue of how to decide
who are the appropriate beneficiaries in a general maritime claim for
wrongful death. However, from among these decisions it is apparent
that there is a clearly discernible trend to adopt the schedule of bene-
75. For a complete discussion of prior cases see the court's opinion in The Manhasset,
18 F. 918 (ED. Va. 1884).
76. Id. at 920.
77. Id.
78. Actually, the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970), is incorporated
by reference into the Jones Act awarding damages "in case of death of such employee, to
his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband or
husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent
on such employee. ... Id.
79. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970), provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default
occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the
District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the per-
sonal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district
courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's
wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or cor-
poration which would have been liable if death had not ensued.
900
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ficiaries from DOHSA.80 Most of the responsibility for the instigation
of this trend is attributable to the Supreme Court's apparent approval
in Moragne of the DOHSA schedule of beneficiaries.8 ' Illustrative of
this attitude is a Delaware court's opinion in Smith v. Allstate Yacht
Rentals, Ltd.,s2 wherein they stated:
While the Supreme Court did not have occasion to finally deter-
mine the beneficiaries who were entitled to recover from the
wrongful death action in Moragne, the logic of the arguments pre-
sented by the United States, their lengthy discussion by the Su-
preme Court and the fact that it is the standard already being
applied in other state court maritime actionss3 are convincing that
the beneficiary schedule in the Death on the High Seas Act is to
be applied in this case.8 4
Interestingly, one court at least has decided on a contrary course of
action and has referred to a state statute for guidance where the deaths
occurred within state inland waters. In Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr.
& Associates,85 the court, in applying Arkansas law, relied on the
80. The DOHSA schedule of beneficiaries has been expressly adopted by at least four
courts with the most recent opinion being the best reasoned of the four. See In re Cambria
S.S. Co., 353 F. Supp. 691 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (thorough analysis given to federal and all state
schemes for qualification as a beneficiary although DOHSA schedule was ultimately ap-
plied). See also Green v. Ross, 338 F. Supp. 365 (S.D. Fla. 1972). "It is appropriate, however,
for the claims to be brought by the personal representative for the exclusive benefit of the
eligible beneficiaries, as is done under the DOHSA." Id. at 366. Smith v. Allstate Yacht
Rentals, Ltd., 293 A.2d 805 (Del. 1972) (see text corresponding to note 84 infra); Guilbeau
v. Calzada, 240 So. 2d 104 (La. 1970). "Uniformity has always been of paramount impor-
tance in admiralty matters. Borrowing the schedule of beneficiaries provided in DOHSA
for wrongful death actions under general maritime law will in our opinion more nearly
accomplish this objective. We, therefore, conclude that it should be applied in this in-
stance." Id. at 110.
Two other courts have followed the general reasoning advanced by the United States in
support of its argument favoring application of the beneficiaries enumerated in DOHSA.
See In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971); Smith v. Olsen and
Ugelstad, 324 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
Finally, in two other decisions the court in each apparently sidestepped the issue where
both factual situations involved both Jones Act and DOHSA claims and where analogy to
state statutes were not pursued. Implicit in both opinions were determinations that no
conflict existed between the Jones Act and DOHSA schedules of beneficiaries. In Mungin
v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 342 F. Supp. 479, 481 (D. Md. 1972), the court held that the illegiti-
mate children of the deceased were proper beneficiaries and recognized as such under
either statute. However, in McPherson v. Steamship S. African Pioneer, 321 F. Supp. 42,
(E.D. Va. 1971), the court concluded that a woman who the deceased seaman was living
with, but not married to, at the time of his death, had had no right to participate as a
beneficiary with respect to any recovery under either statute, her dependency on the dece-
dent notwithstanding. The court felt that the proper beneficiaries were those persons con-
tained in both statutes. Id. at 48-49.
81. See discussion at note 74 supra.
82. 293 A.2d 805 (Del. 1972).
83. The court cited Guilbeau v. Calzada, 240 So. 2d 104 (La. 1970).
84. 293 A.2d at 810.
85. 328 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Ark. 1971), afJ'd, 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972).
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facts that the work of the decedents and defendant occurred in Arkan-
sas, the deaths occurred in Arkansas, and the suit was maintained in
Arkansas. 6 The court rejected an argument by the defendant that if
state rather than federal law, is applicable, then the appropriate state
law would be that of Texas, the decedent's domicile at death.s7 Pres-
ently, this decision stands by itself in applying state law based solely on
what appears to be the mechanical "place-of-the-wrong" conflict of laws
rule.88 While this writer does not agree that Spiller is subject to so sim-
ple an interpretation at least one court apparently disagrees, rejecting
Spiller on this basis.8 9
Arguments advocating application of DOHSA by analogy to the gen-
eral maritime law to determine the proper beneficiaries certainly ap-
pear quite sound. As a result, it seems unlikely that there will be any
substantial development of a line of cases adopting the Spiller ration-
ale. For the reasons advanced by the Supreme Court in Moragne, and
in the interests of uniformity of the law in admirality, wide acceptance
of the DOHSA schedule of beneficiaries by courts appears certain.
D. Damages
The appropriate elements of damage that should be recoverable for
a death action under general maritime law has been the issue most
frequently litigated since Moragne. As previously stated, Moragne left
this question unresolved but suggested that the long experience of the
lower courts in dealing with compensable death damage issues indi-
cated that little trouble would be encountered. The Supreme Court
stated additionally that the courts will not be without persuasive
analogy for guidance. In the very next sentence reference was made
to the long standing success of both DOHSA and the numerous state
wrongful death acts.9 Had the Supreme Court simply stated that the
damage issue would be left to the lower courts for resolution, I suggest
that the Court would have advanced the desired goal of uniformity. In
referring to the success of DOHSA and existence of some persuasive
86. Cf. Petition of Canal Barge Co., 323 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
87. 466 F.2d at 905.
88. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLcr OF LAWs 210-18 (1971).
89. In re Cambria S.S. Co., 353 F. Supp. 691, 694 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
90. "If still other subsidiary issues should require resolution, such as particular ques-
tions of the measure of damages, the courts will not be without persuasive analogy for
guidance. Both the Death on the High Seas Act and the numerous state wrongful-death
acts have been implemented with success for decades. 398 U.S. at 408.
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analogy for guidance in the same breath it was reasonable for the lower
courts to have relied on the belief that the application of the DOHSA
standard of compensable damages to a general maritime action would
be treated favorably by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, to-
tally confused the situation by also making reference to the continued
success of state death acts. This confusion stems from the inconsistency,
in allowing reference to both DOHSA and state death acts. The fact
that not all states employ the same pecuniary loss language as does
DOHSA in limiting damages is only one source of this inconsistency.
An additional problem was encountered upon the realization that even
among those states utilizing the pecuniary loss language, the definition
of what constituted a pecuniary loss often varied. Moragne, therefore,
was useless to the lower courts in their determination of what damages
might be compensable under maritime law. It was only authority for
the proposition that the lower courts were free to make completely
independent determinations regarding the elements of damage that
should comprise a wrongful death recovery.
Almost immediately after Moragne a divergence of authority existed
as to the appropriate damage elements. The clearest division of cases
that was made on this issue generally separated those cases which had
applied the Jones Act and DOHSA standard for awarding damages91
-usually on the rationale of preserving uniformity-from a growing,
number of cases deviating from the confines of these statutes by allow-
ing for a broader and more comprehensive recovery.92
In January 1974, the Supreme Court endeavored to resolve the con-
troversy surrounding the damage issue with their decision in Sea-Land
Services v. Gaudet.93 This is the only Supreme Court decision handed
down since the creation of the maritime wrongful death remedy ad-
dressing itself to the problems Moragne left unresolved. If Sea-Land is
any indication of what can be expected from the Court in attempting
91. See, e.g., United States Steel Corporation v. Lamp, 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); Kaiser v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La.
1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1974); Mascuilli v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 439
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Mungin v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 342 F. Supp. 479 (D. Md. 1972); Petition of
Canal Barge Co., 323 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Miss. 1971), af'd in part, 480 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.
1973). See in addition cases cited note 148 infra.
92. See, e.g., Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Assoc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972);
Gaudet v. Sea-Land Servs. Inc., 463 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Farrell Lines, Inc., 339
F. Supp. 91 (E.D. La. 1971); In re Sincere Navigation, 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971);
Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. La. 1971), rev'd in part, 453 F.2d
137 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); Smith v. Allstate Yacht Rentals, Ltd.,
293 A.2d 805 (Del. 1972).
93. 94 S. Ct. 806 (1974).
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to resolve problems created by Moragne then the uniformity doctrine-
so precious to admiralty-will continue to elude application in mari-
time wrongful death cases.
Before consideration of Sea-Land, a discussion of the development of
the damage issue since Moragne will help to focus on the problems
created and the problems resolved by Sea-Land.
1. Lower Court Development
The most common measure of damages utilized in the state statutes
is the pecuniary loss standard.9 4 This is also the measure of damages
adopted by DOHSA95 and the Jones Act.9 6 Several elements have been
interpreted as being encompassed within the pecuniary loss standard.
Among them are: (1) the amount of support which it could be ex-
pected the decedent would have contributed during his lifetime to the
beneficiary; 97 (2) loss of services the decedent would have rendered to
the beneficiary; 98 (3) deprivation of the nurture, guidance and educa-
tion a parent would have given to his minor child;9 9 and loss of in-
heritable estate. 100 Similarly, damages for the death of a minor child
94. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 3.1. Speiser concludes that ". . . damages are awarded for
the present value of probable contributions which the deceased would have made to the
survivors had he lived, and for the pecuniary value of ...a parent's training, guidance,
nurture and education. In addition, a number of courts allow recovery of medical expenses,
funeral expenses and the amount of the probable inheritance the deceased would have left
to the survivors after living out his normal life span." Id.
95. "The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary
loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought . 46 U.S.C. § 762
(1970).
96. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The Jones Act adopted the pecuniary loss standard from
judicial construction of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In Michigan Cent. R.R. v.
Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913), the Court decided that damages recoverable under FELA are
limited to injuries capable of pecuniary valuation.
97. See, e.g., Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., 407 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1969); Noel v. United
Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964); National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400
(5th Cir. 1959) (DOHSA); Cleveland Tankers, Inc. v. Tierney, 169 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1948)
(Jones Act); Daughdrill v. Diamond "M" Drilling, Co., 305 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. La. 1969);
Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, 248 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Orona v. Is-
brandtsen Co., 204 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1963).
98. Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913); Sabine Towing v. Brennan,
85 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Van Breeck v. Sabine Towing
Co., 200 U.S. 342 (1937); Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, 248 F. Supp. 15
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
99. See, e.g., Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913); Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961); Daughdrill v. Diamond "M" Drilling
Co., 305 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. La. 1969); Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, 248 F.
Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Orona v. Isbrandtsen, 204 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 313
F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1963); Petition of Midwest Towing Co., 203 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Ill. 1962).
100. See, e.g., National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959); Daughdrill v.
Diamond "M" Drilling Co., 305 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. La. 1969); Petition of United States,
303 F. Supp. 1282, 1306 (E.D.N.C. 1969).
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have been allowed upon proof that future contributions to the bene-
ficiaries were reasonably foreseeable. 101
Neither DOHSA nor the Jones Act have been interpreted to include
recovery for damages caused by loss of comfort, society, consortium,
02
love, affection, grief, wounded feelings, 03 emotional distress or for the
economic value of decedent's life to himself.'" Conversely, many of the
elements denied under a Jones Act or DOHSA action have been held
to be compensable under various state statutes. 05
One principal distinction between the Jones Act and DOHSA should
be mentioned. Under the Jones Act the personal representative of the
decedent has been allowed to recover for the decedent's pain and suffer-
ing as well as the beneficiaries' pecuniary losses. 106 Recovery under
DOHSA, however, is restricted to the beneficiaries' pecuniary losses
only.'0 7
As with the other questions left unresolved by Moragne, the trend
had been to apply the measure of damages traditionally allowable un-
der DOHSA. The first case to adopt the pecuniary loss standard was
United States Steel Corp. v. Lamp. 0 In Lamp the controversy arose
from the collision of two vessels on the territorial waters of Michigan
causing a number of injuries and deaths among the crew of the United
101. See, e.g., Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1959).
102. See Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257. (2d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964); Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 310 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa.
1970); Savard v. Marine Contracting Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Conn. 1969);. Simpson v.
Knutsen, 296 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 444 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1971); Valitutto
v. D/S I/D Garonne, 295 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Ridgedell v. Olympic Towing Corp.,
205 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. La. 1962); Gerado v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal.
1951). Consortium has, at times, been referred to variously as "care, comfort, affection,
companionship, society and counsel." Simpson v. Knutsen, 296 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (N.D.
Cal. 1969).
103. See, e.g., Ridgedell v. Olympic Towing Corp., 205 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. La. 1962)
(Jones Act).
104. Hickman v. Taylor, 170 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 906 (1949).
In addition, funeral expenses are generally considered expenses of the estate and not a
pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries under DOHSA or the Jones Act. See, e.g., Cities Serv.
Oil Co. v. Launey, 403 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1968); First Nat'l Bank v. National Airlines, 171
F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); cf. Heffner v. Pennsylvania R.R., 81 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.' 1936);
The Culberson, 61 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1932); Moore v. The O/S Fram, 226 F. Supp. 816
(S.D. Tex. 1963); Farmer v. O/S Fluffy, 220 F. Supp. 917 (S.D. Tex. 1963). Contra, Greene
v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1972); Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp.,'453
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
105. At the time Moragne was decided nearly half the states recognized either loss of
love and affection or survivors' grief and mental suffering as compensable injuries. See
generally S. SpEisER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH Appendix A. (Supp. 1972).
106. See, e.g., St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915) (FELA); Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989
(1962).
107. See, e.g., Brown v. Anderson-Nichols & Co., 203 F. Supp. 489 (D. Mass. 1962).
108. 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970).
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States Steel vessel. Both shipowners admitted liability to the seamen
involved, leaving open a question of possible punitive damages against
United States Steel and compensatory damages against both parties.109
The lower court awarded punitive damages against United States Steel
but this decision was reversed on appeal.110 On the second appeal to
the Sixth Circuit the court upheld the lower court's awards for de-
cedents' pain and suffering under the Jones Act, but reversed the
awards for the widows' loss of consortium, counsel, and guidance, and
for the adult children's loss of love, companionship, and guidance,
which had been claimed pursuant to the Michigan statute1 ' against the
owner of the other vessel, a Norwegian corporation."12 On the third
appeal, the Sixth Circuit confirmed this earlier decision." 3 In striking
down these items, the court said the precise issue was whether the defi-
nition of pecuniary loss was to be governed by the principles of general
maritime law or by the Michigan court's interpretation of the Michi-
gan wrongful death statute." 4 The court held that it was no longer
bound to give effect to state law in light of the overriding federal
policy in Moragne. The court finally reasoned that Moragne had exclu-
sively adopted the pecuniary loss standard implemented under DOHSA
and the Jones Act. 15
Following the Lamp decision a number of courts had similarly
adopted the pecuniary loss standard as outlined in DOHSA. In Petition
of Canal Barge,"6 the personal representative of decedent was allowed
damages for the beneficiaries' actual pecuniary losses but recovery for
survivors' grief damages were denied. 17 The court cited Lamp for the
proposition that Moragne did not require the adoption of -"any differ-
ent or greater measure of damages""18 than already existed in maritime
law. The court stated that the "uniformity and supremacy of the mari-
time law dictate the need and desirability of a national rule for com-
109. 479 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1973).
110. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 US. 958 (1970).
111. Micis. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 27A.2922 (1962). The wrongful death statute had been
interpreted to include the widow's loss of consortium. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Stephan,
359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960). Awards to adult emancipated children have not been
allowed under the Michigan statute. See, e.g., Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich.
251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970).
112. 436 F.2d at 1277-78.
113. 479 F.2d at 498.
114. 436 F.2d at 1278.
115. Id.
116. 323 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd in part, 480 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1973).
117. 323 F. Supp. at 821.
118. Id.
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puting damages." 19 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower
court that survivors' grief damages were not recoverable in a general
maritime action.12 0 The court then announced the appropriate pro-
cedure for balancing state and federal law to arrive at a reasonable so-
lution for recoverable damages as mandated by Moragne.121
Both Lamp and Canal Barge were cited with approval in Mungin v.
Calmar Steamship Corp.12 The court applied the pecuniary loss stand-
ard reasoning that Moragne did not require the application of any
other standard.12
In another recent case, Mascuilli v. United States, 24 the pecuniary
standard was again adopted as the appropriate measure of damages un-
der Moragne. The decision is noteworthy because the court, in arriving
at this conclusion, looked both to DOHSA and to the Pennsylvania
wrongful death statute.125 The court reasoned that since both statutes
employed a pecuniary loss standard this would be the appropriate meas-
ure of damages to apply.126 The court noted that the Third Circuit has
held that funeral expenses are not available under DOHSA.127 Instead
of following this precedent, however, the court-applying the Pennsyl-
vania precedent-included this item in its award to decedent's widow
and children. The court stated that "in view of Moragne and the ma-
jority view of the states, a contrary result might well be reached
today." 28
119. Id.
120. 480 F.2d 11, 29-30 (5th Cir. 1973).
121. Id. at 31.
The methodology for 'further sifting' contemplated by Moragne has thus been firmly
established in this circuit. In shaping the new remedy we look first to existing mari-
time law, to which Moragne has allowed access in a death action. We next examine
the remedial policies indicated by Congress in the federal maritime statutes. Heed
to those statutes will assist in ensuring that 'uniform vindication of federal policies'
mandated by the Moragne Court. Finally, we look for 'persuasive analogies' in the
state wrongful death acts. The importance of the role of these state acts is accented
by their long and successful contribution to the growth of federal maritime law, and
in their assistance in influencing the direction of admiralty law toward solution of
contemporary maritime problems. To the extent that policies developed under state
death remedies are applicable in a maritime context, then, those policies should influ-
ence the content of the new maritime death remedy.
Id.
122. 342 F. Supp. 479 (D. Md. 1972).
123. "In the absence of any indication from the Supreme Court that Moragne damages
should differ from those generally permissible under existing statutory authority, and in
the interest of insuring uniformity in maritime law, the usual measure of damages, actual
pecuniary loss, will be awarded." Id. at 482.
124. 343 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953).
126. 343 F. Supp. at 441.
127. The Culberson, 61 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1932).
128. 343 F. Supp. at 442 n.5. The court cited Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 323
F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. La. 1971), for authority on this point.
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In contrast to the cases which have routinely applied the pecuniary
loss standard as interpreted under DOHSA, a number of courts have
taken a more liberal approach in considering the awardable damages in
maritime wrongful death actions. In Dennis v. Central Gulf Steamship
Corp.,129 the court cited Lamp for the proposition that Moragne freed
admiralty courts from applying state law in maritime wrongful death
actions. The court in Dennis apparently formulated a rule of damages
broader than the DOHSA standard. The court allowed damages for
decedent's pain and suffering, 30 for loss of his support and services,' 3 '
and for funeral expenses.13 2 On appeal,'- the court sustained the awards
for damages but reversed the trial court's holding that Moragne auto-
matically precluded federal courts from relying on state law. The court
explained that the uniformity argument advanced in Moragne dealt
"not with differing elements of damages" but rather with the need to
eliminate the various bases of liability fostered by The Harrisburg.84
In re Sincere Navigation'35 is an interesting case because the court
allowed the beneficiaries to recover damages for emotional distress. 36
The court observed that state law undertakes to compensate the sur-
vivors' wounded feelings either directly, or by returning large verdicts
for decedents' pain and suffering "in circumstances where its existence
and intensity can only be conjectured."' 3 7
In re Farrell Lines, Inc.,35 decided by the same court that decided
Dennis and Sincere Navigation, adopted the reasoning and conclusions
of these cases and awarded damages for nonpecuniary injuries. Farrell
129. 323 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. La. 1971).
130. 'It seems anomalous for the decedent's family to lose what the decedent could
himself have collected had he filed a suit and prosecuted it to judgment during his life."
Id. at 949.
131. Id. The court adjusted the awards for financial support by the amount that would
be taxed as decedent's gross income. The court in Lamp held that the district court had
erred in subtracting projected taxes from financial support on the grounds that the impact
of future taxes was too unpredictable to calculate in advance. In Dennis, the court allowed
interest from the date of death rather than the date of the judgment. An opposite result
was reached in Lamp. The matter is within the discretion of the trial court under DOHSA.
See, e.g., National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
885 (1959).
132. 323 F. Supp. at 950. The court reasoned that the overruling of The Harrisburg
could be interpreted to have revived case law prior to that decision which allowed re-
covery for funeral expenses in wrongful death actions. See, e.g., Hollyday v. Reeves, 12 F.
Cas. 386 (No. 6625) (D.C.D. Md. 1879).
133. 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
134. 453 F.2d at 140.
135. 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971).
136. Id. at 657. "[It] is clear that there is no bar in the maritime law to the recovery of
damages for emotional injury as such." Id. at 654.
137. Id. at 659.
138. 339 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. La. 1971).
908
Vol. 12: 891, 1974
Comments
involved the collision of two vessels on the Mississippi River. The
collision resulted in the death of an unmarried nineteen-year-old mid-
shipman at the Merchant Marine Academy. Suit was brought under the
general maritime law, the Jones Act, and Louisiana's wrongful death
statute. Emphasizing that damages depend upon proof of actual loss
and injury, the court found no proof of parents' loss of care, advice,
and guidance. Damages were allowed for decedent's conscious pain and
suffering due to evidence that the decedent had been badly burned
prior to drowning. The fact that decedent's corpse was dismembered
when recovered was not dispositive evidence of conscious pain and suf-
fering and was therefore disregarded. The court also allowed damages
for funeral expenses, loss of financial contributions, and for the parents'
loss of love and affection and emotional suffering.189 The court com-
pared the decision in Lamp with Sincere Navigation, noting that the
Lamp court had ignored the Moragne decision to the extent that the
Supreme Court stated that state wrongful death acts, as well as federal
statutes, would be "persuasive analogy" in fashioning a maritime
wrongful death remedy. Conversely, in Sincere Navigation, the court
relied on state laws for guidance and permitted damages which had
been previously unrecognized in admiralty. Using the Sincere Naviga-
tion reasoning the Farrell court did not merely rely on Louisiana law,
but rather looked to state laws in general to support its decision.140
In Smith v. Allstate Yacht Rentals, Ltd.,141 a Delaware court allowed
damages for survivors' emotional distress as compensable within the
general maritime law. The court attacked the Canal Barge decision be-
cause of the interpretation given to the Moragne decision, stating that
only the law of the adjacent state might be considered, rather than
looking for the trends and the better rules and remedies afforded by the
various state statutes. 42 Citing Sincere Navigation, the court in Smith
reasoned that liberal and humane principles should be adopted in de-
termining the proper measure of damages in admiralty rather than
established but restrictive principles. Looking to the national trend
allowing recovery for emotional distress the court held that admiralty
must compensate this injury under the new cause of action within gen-
eral maritime law.143
139. Id. at 94.
140. Id. at 93-94.
141. 293 A.2d 805 (Del. 1972).
142. Id. at 812.
143. Id. at 813.
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Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Associates144 recognized that allow-
ing a survival action for pain and suffering under the general maritime
law was simply a logical extension of Moragne. The court cited with ap-
proval the decision in Dennis as authority for this extension. 145 The
court also cited Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques,4 stating that
an admiralty court will look to prevailing land law for a remedy when
none exists under maritime law. 47
The decisions in Dennis, Farrell and Spiller, throw into sharp focus
one of the major unresolved questions concerning damage recoveries
in general. Deferred to later in this comment is a discussion concerning
the present status of survival actions especially in light of the decision
in Sea-Land.
Absent the decision the Supreme Court reached in Sea-Land, the
most recent federal cases' 48 would seemingly have represented an en-
trenchment of pecuniary loss modeled, for the most part, on DOHSA.
For example, in Kaiser v. Traveler's Insurance Co., 4 9 the court denied
recovery for loss of love and affection for the father of a water skier
killed when he struck a partially submerged and unmarked barge while
water skiing. The court also denied a recovery for survivor's grief but
said the plaintiff was entitled to $960.30, which constituted the amount
expended for the funeral and which was the only pecuniary loss
proved. 50 The court allowed recovery for only pecuniary loss, citing
Canal Barge, but indicated that the question of what damages are
recoverable "may not be completely settled" in the circuit.' 51 The Fifth
144. 466 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1972).
145. Id. at 909.
146. 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964).
147. This principle has been succinctly stated recently in Marsh v. Buckeye S.S. Co., 330
F. Supp. 972 (NJ). Ohio 1971):
The question of whether an action can survive to a representative of a deceased party
plaintiff is strictly a matter of state substantive law .... Since the general maritime
law itself contains no survival provision, it is only through the adoption of a state
survival act by this Court that the right of survival of the action may accrue to the
representative of the deceased. Moragne held that the general maritime law does con-
tain a provision for wrongful death, but was silent as to the survival of personal
injury actions after the death of the plaintiff. However, the thrust of Moragne is that
the law of admiralty should be expanded so that seamen are given a federal right to
recover from their employers for negligence regardless of the location of their injury
or death.
Id. at 974.
148. See Hueschen v. Fluor Ocean Servs. Inc., 483 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1973); Higgin-
botham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 360 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. La. 1973); Kaiser v. Traveler's Ins.
Co., 359 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1974); In re Cambria
S.S. Co., 353 F. Supp. 691 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Green v. Ross, 338 F. Supp. 365 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
149. 359 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1974).
150. 359 F. Supp. at 95.
151. Id.
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Circuit, however, affirmed 152 the lower court's opinion as to the proper
damages awardable. The irony involved was that with the appellate
decision to affirm on January 11, 1974, the Fifth Circuit appeared to
have finally and conclusively established 58 that the proper standard of
compensable damages was one based on pecuniary loss only. Ten days
later Sea-Land was decided wherein the Court held154 that loss of so-
ciety 55 is a compensable element of damage under general maritime
law.
2. Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet
In addition to allowing for the recovery of loss of society the Court
also held that loss of support 56 and loss of services'57 were compensable
damages. Sea-Land involved an action by the widow of a longshoreman
for the death of her husband from the injuries he sustained while work-
ing aboard the defendant's vessel in the navigable waters of Louisiana.
Before the longshoreman's death he brought an action based on un-
seaworthiness in which he recovered damages for past and future wages,
pain and suffering, and medical expenses.158 The district court dis-
missed the widow's action based on the fact that decedent had already
maintained a successful action which now served to bar the widow's
suit on res judicata principles. 59 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed and stated that under the Moragne decision the widow had a
completely independent cause of action not extinguished by a recovery
obtained by the decedent prior to death. 160 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari' 6 ' to consider the question of whether Moragne did
in fact contemplate the widow's action for wrongful death as a com-
pletely separate and independent cause of action; 62 finally affirming
this result 63 in a 5-4 decision. 64 The opinion, however, concentrated
152. 487 F.2d at 1301.
153. See also Hueschen v. Fluor Ocean Servs. Inc., 483 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1973).
154. 94 S. Ct. at 816.
155. Loss of love and affection are elements of loss of society according to Sea-Land. Id.
at 815.
156. Id. at 814.
157. Id. at 815.
158. Id. at 809.
159. Id. at 810.
160. 463 F.2d 1331, 1332 (5th Cir. 1972).
161. 411 U.S. 963 (1973).
162. 94 S. Ct. at 809.
163. Id. at 810.
164. Mr. Justice Powell dissented and was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist. Id. at 820.
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on two major issues, one of which concerned the aforementioned prob-
lem of res judicata. The second problem concerned the question of
appropriate damages.165
The Sea-Land decision will probably be recognized and criticized
more for its discussion of collateral estoppel than for compensable dam-
ages for wrongful death under the general maritime law. For purposes
of this comment the collateral estoppel discussion is noteworthy be-
cause of the ramifications of the decision on the relationship of sur-
vival actions to wrongful death actions. Collateral estoppel was the
doctrine employed as the solution to prevent the double recovery of
damages. 166 Resort was made to collateral estoppel because the Supreme
Court, in ruling that the widow's action was separate and independent
from the decedent's action, eliminated the possible application of res
judicata.
Recovery for loss of support, having been universally recognized as
proper in a wrongful death action, presented the Court with no prob-
lem as a compensable element of damage under general maritime
law.167 Similarly, the Court stated that the majority of state death acts,
along with DOHSA, have been interpreted to permit recovery for loss
of services. 16 8
. Allowing the recovery of damages for loss of society, however, pre-
sented more of a problem to the Court. "Society" was interpreted to
contain ".. . a broad range of mutual benefits each family member
receives from the others' continued existence, including love, affection,
care, attention, companionship, comfort and protection."' 1 9 The prob-
.lem existed because traditionally none of these losses were considered
pecuniary losses and therefore were not compensable. The Court over-
came this problem by stating that twenty-seven out of the forty-four
state or territorial death acts which measure damages by the loss sus-
165. Id. at 814-17.
166. Concern was expressed in Sea-Land because the widow was claiming damages for
loss of support although the deceased husband had recovered for loss of future wages.
Id. at 818.
167. Id. at 814.
168. The Court stated that services included "... the nurture, training, education and
guidance that a child would have received had not the parent been wrongfully killed.
Services the decedent performed at home or for his spouse are also compensable." Id. at
815.
169. Id.
Loss of society must not be confused with mental anguish or grief, which are not com-
pensable under the maritime wrongful death remedy. The former entails the loss of
positive benefits, while the latter represents an emotional response to the wrongful
death.
Id. at n.17.
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tained by the beneficiaries allow recovery for loss of society.170 Having
noted that this number represents a majority of the states and that the
probable trend is in this direction, the Court allowed loss of society as
a compensable element of damage. 17 1
The Court did not establish whether loss of society should be con-
sidered as a pecuniary or non-pecuniary loss. Many states do interpret
loss of society as compensable within the framework of their statutes
which are nevertheless limited to pecuniary losses only.172 In contrast,
courts have interpreted loss of society as a non-pecuniary loss and,
therefore, not compensable under DOHSA and most state death acts.
Thus, in avoiding any characterization of loss of society, the Court ap-
parently has demonstrated that the general maritime law will not be
governed by statutorily created terminology like pecuniary loss. The
Court allowed recovery for items that most courts deciding the issue
since Moragne have disallowed. The dissent in Sea-Land argued that
those courts disallowing recovery for loss of society or the "affection-
related" damages were merely following Moragne's admonition not to
fashion a whole new body of law in a wrongful death action.173 This
misplaced reliance should have been avoided from the outset by a more
precise fashioning of the Moragne remedy. This criticism is especially
valid because the Court admits that regardless of the national trend
their decision would have been compelled so as to "comport with the
humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show 'special solicitude' for
those who are injured within its jurisdiction."' 74
Finally, the Court also allowed recovery for funeral expenses in all
cases where the decedent's dependents have either paid for the funeral
or are liable for its payment.175 Under DOHSA most cases considering
this claim have held that funeral expenses were not a pecuniary loss
although there were a few cases allowing such recovery. 176 In addition,
funeral expenses were compensable under general maritime law prior
to The Harrisburg.177 As a result, the Court could find no persuasive
170. Id. at 816 n21.
171. Id. at 816.
172. Specifically, the statutes of California, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and the Virgin Islands were included in this category. Id. at 817 n.21.
173. Id. at 826.
174. Id. at 816.
175. Id. at 818.
176. See cases cited note 104 supra.
177. See, e.g., Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386 (No. 6625) (D.C.D. Md.
1879). See discussion at note 152 supra.
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reason for not following the earlier admiralty rule allowing such re-
covery. 178
The dissenting opinion concentrates mainly on criticism of the
Court's novel argument concerning the application of collateral estop-
pel. However, the dissent did criticize the Court's decision to allow
recovery for loss of society as nullifying the effect of the Jones Act and
DOHSA-the congressional enactments previously governing maritime
wrongful death. The reasoning was that no one entitled to rely on the
admiralty doctrine of unseaworthiness will seek relief under the federal
statutes unless a jury trial is desired and a Jones Act count is joined.17 9
This argument seems fairly persuasive but it must be remembered that
since the expansion of the warranty of seaworthiness to encompass an
absolute liability standard little reliance has been placed on DOHSA
where both counts could be averred. It would be premature to deter-
mine what further effect the general maritime law will eventually have
on statutory remedies.
3. Survival Actions
The Moragne decision did not determine if a claimant could recover
for the decedent's pain and suffering, lost wages and medical expenses
under a general maritime law cause of action. From a discussion of the
common law,'8 0 earlier in this Comment, it could be seen that almost
every state enacted a statute allowing for the survival of a cause of action
to recover these damages as there was no right of recovery under the
common law.'8 ' Since Moragne relied on the abandonment of the com-
mon law rule in establishing a remedy for wrongful death, this reasoning
should be equally applicable to survival actions. Thus, there would
seem to be no public policy against the recognition of such a cause of
action.
Subsequent to the Moragne decision all the courts confronted with
the issue of survival damages basically have held that those actions
which a decedent himself could have brought had he lived will survive
178. 94 S. Ct. at 818.
179. Id. at 820.
180. The first reported case in admiralty was Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No.
11,234) (D.C.D. Me. 1825). The early cases did not allow a right of action for pain and
suffering to survive death. See, e.g., The E.B. Ward, Jr., 17 F. 456 (E.D. La. 1883); Hollyday
v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386 (No. 6625) (D.C.D. Md. 1879); Crapo v. Allen, 6 F. Cas.
763 (No. 3360) (D.C.D. Mass. 1849).
181. See SPFIsxR, supra note 2, § 14. See also discussion of survival action in text
corresponding to notes 23-27 supra.
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him in an action in admiralty. l 2 The question remains, however,
whether a state survival statute may continue to be applied in ad-
miralty.
In Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp.,l s3 the Third Circuit held that
a state survival statute could be applied to supplement DOHSA which
does not provide for the survival of actions. In Ward v. Union Barge
Line Corp.,1s4 the Third Circuit indicated, as did the Dennis and
Spiller decisions which followed, that a survival action could be main-
tained under general maritime law. The court implied that reference
to a state survival statute for recovery under general maritime law
could still be maintained after Moragne.8 5
In Sea-Land, the Supreme Court was not faced with the issue because
the decedent had recovered in an action prior to his death. As a result,
the widow would have been barred from claiming traditional survival
action damages.
Two questions concerning survival actions remain unanswered. Can
Moragne be construed to have impliedly created a survival action un-
der general maritime law? Regardless of whether Moragne created a
survival action or not, can resort be made to a state survival statute
as a basis for recovery of survival damages by the beneficiaries? If
Moragne has not created a general maritime right of recovery for sur-
vival damages then resort to a state statute would appear to be as per-
missible now as it was prior to Moragne. The lower courts, however,
have construed Moragne as impliedly creating a maritime action for
survival damages. Certainly this would appear to be the better reason-
ing. Thus, resort to a state survival statute should be deemed preempted
on the same rationale which it is argued that resort to state wrongful
death statutes are preempted or that such statutes can only be used for
guidance.
As can be seen from Sea-Land, use of state statutes for guidance does
not mean a reference to a particular state's provision. Rather, the
Court in Sea-Land utilized Moragne to the extent that reference could
be made only to what the majority of states thought was compensable
damages.
182. See, e.g., Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Assoc., 466 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1972); Den-
nis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. La. 1971), afl'd, 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1972).
183. 438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971).
184. 443 F.2d 565 (3d Cir. 1971).
185. Id. at 569.
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Other portions of the Moragne opinion also militate in favor of a
conclusion that the new federal right of action preempts the entire
field. The Court, for example, in its interest in the principle of uni-
formity, states that its ". . . recognition of a right to recover for
wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vin-
dication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies
that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial
statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts."'' 1 6 In addition,
the Court indicated that the problems left unresolved by its decision
could in most respects find their resolution by looking to the law
applicable in personal injury cases.' 87 This language is interesting since
courts are prohibited from applying a state standard of duty different
from that imposed in admiralty in personal injury cases, and state law
cannot be resorted to either to increase or decrease the damages recov-
erable.188 If this is the result in personal injury cases it would seem to
be equally as valid in actions for wrongful death.
It could be argued, in addition, that reference to state statutes is no
longer necessary because the reason for the reference no longer exists.
The void in the maritime law could now be remedied by reference to
federal law which provides both the right and remedy. Departing from
the long tradition of resorting to state law to fill the void is certainly
no more disruptive than establishing a completely new right of action.
Therefore, the best resolution of the problem would be a conclusion
that Moragne not only recognized a general maritime right of action
for wrongful death but also for survival damages. Accepting Moragne
as recognizing a survival action in the maritime law, then resort to
state survival statutes should only be made for guidance in fashioning
a maritime remedy in the same way that Sea-Land found guidance in
state wrongful death statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Moragne left much for subsequent decisions to resolve. Most of the
unresolved problems have been answered although they have not neces-
sarily been finally settled. For example, the unresolved questions of
proper beneficiaries and the time limitation in which to bring suit left
186. 398 U.S. at 401.
187. Id. at 405.
188. See Kermaric v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625 (1959). See also Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion in Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 322 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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by Moragne have been resolved in the lower courts. Until the Supreme
Court decides otherwise it seems that laches should be the only doctrine
to apply in limiting the time in which to bring suit and the DOHSA
schedule of beneficiaries is the proper one in a wrongful death action
under general maritime law. The Supreme Court in Sea-Land appears
to have settled the question of the appropriate measure of damages by
allowing recovery for loss of support, loss of services and loss of society
while denying recovery for mental distress or anguish.
At this writing only the question of survival action damages has been
left by the Supreme Court. Following the example of lower court
decisions, it would seem that Moragne can be viewed as having created
a survival action under maritime law with instruction to the lower
courts to fashion survival damages in the same way that damages for
wrongful death were to be established. Finally, Sea-Land has provided
the lower courts with an adequate example of how and what Moragne
intended on the relevance and applicability of state statutes and the
establishment of damages.
STEPHEN LEVIN
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